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Whether  the intensity  of domestic  competition  beyond trade liberalisation  has a positive
influence  on economic  growth is an open question,  both theoretically  and empirically.
The existing theoretical work  does not  provide a  clear-cut answer to  whether  a
monopolist's  higher  tendency  to innovate  is outweighled  by the productivity  gains induced
by competition  (see Rey 1997  for a survey  of this literature,  anid  Aghion and Howitt 1998
for a recent theoretical  treatnent). A number  of studies  have attempted  to settle  this issue
by using industiy or firm level data: (i) increases in concentration  are associated with
reductions  in technical  efficiency  (Caves and Barton 1990, Green and Mayes 1991, and
Caves and Associates 1992); (ii)  fewer competitors and higher average rents  are
associated with  lower productivity growth (Nickell  1996); (i.ii) trade liberalisation and
industrial  deregulation  can have positive effects on iinn-level  productivity  (for example,
Harrison 1994 cn C6te d'Ivoire, LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes  1999 oln  Mexico, and
Graham  et all.  1983 on U.S. airline deregulation);  and (iv) increases  in concentration  and
other measures of monopoly power dampen innovative activity (Gercski 1990 and
Blundell  et al. 1995).
The  ava.ilable empirical studies fail  to  capture economy-wide elffects.  More
importantly,  they focus on manufacturing  industries  and do not include any service or
network-based  industries  such as computer  software,  telecommaunications,  and advanced
logistics  services.  Financial services  also  are  increasingly assuming  network
characteristics  as banks market others' products  in addition  to their own and play the role
of market makers.  In this paper, we adopt a more direct approach and study whether
different availabler  measures  of intensity  of competition  at the economy-wide  level are
positively associated  with economic  development  using data from over 100 countries
over thle  ten-year  period 1986  through 1995. Specifically,  we investigate  whether higher
levels  of domestic  competition,  while controlling  for the degree  of trade liberalisation,  are
significantly  and robustly correlated with faster cunrent and ]^uture  rates of per capita
economic  growth rates.
The existi,ng  empirical  growth literatute  provides the techniques  for testing this kind
of hypothesis  using cross-country  regressions  (Barro 1997). Although  the methodology
is straightforward  (see Temple 1999 for a recent evaluation  of methodology),  the major
empirical challenge is to  define and assemble on  a cross-country comparable basis
variables that can adequately  capture the intensity of economy-wide  competition. We
compile and construct three types of variables related to policy, structure  and mobility.
First, we compile  qualitative  policy  measures  to capture  the quality  of the microeconomic
incentive  regirne and the enabling  legal and regulatory  framework  in areas that directly
promote  competition.  Second, we  compile qualitative  variables  and  construct
quantitative  variab;les  to reflect the extent  to which  market structure  is concentrated  from
1an economy-wide perspective.  Finally, we construct quantitative mobility variables  to
capture the ease with which new enterprises can enter and grow in any market. Although
each competition  indicator has shortcomings, this  array of measures provides  a richer
picture  of intensity  of competition at the economy-wide level than using  only  a single
measure.
We develop as robust a testing methodology  as possible,  given that we have fewer
observations of our competition variables than of the more  standard growth variables.
The smaller subset of countries that each competition indicator covers also varies.  Our
analysis proceeds in three steps.  First, we build parsimonious growth models using core
variables on which there is agreement in the literature.  We require that the explanatory
variables  included  in  these models pass  a  test based  on  an  extreme-bounds  analysis
(EBA) as in Levine and Renelt (1992).  The second step is to study the strength of the
partial correlation of our competition variables with unexplained growth from the growth
models.  Finally, the third step is to test the robustness of these partial correlations using a.
modified EBA procedure.
We find  that key  measures  related to  intensity  of  economy-wide  competition  are
positively associated with unexplained growth.  Most importantly, after controlling for
the traditional  fragility  in  growth  models, we  find  that  one  policy  measure,  namely
whether  antitrust  or  antimonopoly  policy  is  perceived  as  effectively  promoting
competition,  has  a  reliable,  independent  and  robust  statistical  relationship  with
unexplained  growth.  This  variable  is particularly  appealing because  it  captures  the
effectiveness of implementation of competition policy as perceived by key  local market
participants.
II. Indicators of Intensity of Economy-Wide Competition
We begin our analysis by compiling and constructing as many as possible  relevant
quantitative and qualitative variables that may, however imperfectly, capture intensity of
competition at the economy-wide level.  We classify such measures into three categories.
The variables and the data sources are described in Table 1.
Competition policy  variables.  A first  set of measures captures  the quality  of  the
microeconomic incentive  regime  and the  enabling legal  and  regulatory  framework  in
areas that  directly promote  economy-wide competition.  These measures  are indirect
measures of intensity of competition, in the sense that they reflect relevant policy input
rather than any directly resulting intensity of competition  output.  We have identified
seven cross-country comparable policy variables that reflect economy-wide competition
beyond trade liberalisation.  The most promising policy indicator, since it is most directly
related to the effectiveness of competition policy, is a qualitative variable that we  call
ANTITRUST.  This variable is based on direct responses from over 3,000 top business
2executives of  large  international and domestic  finns  in  53 countries  to  the question:
"Does  anti-trust  or  anti-monopoly  policy  in  your  country  effectively  promote
competition?"  This variable became first available in 1996, based on an overhaul of the
former IMD and World Economic Forum World Cornpetitiveness Report.I
A  second related indicator is provided by  the qualitative variable UNFAIR.  This
variable is based  on a somewhat different question: "Do  anti-trust laws prevent unfair
competition in your country?"  We use the 1989-1996 averaLge  for this indicator.  The
shortcoming of this question as posed is that 'unfair competilion'  might mean predation
against cashl-constrained rivals, but  also might  allude to  pressure  on  a  less  efficient
enterprise  applied  by  a  more  efficient  rival  (with  possibl[e overtones  of  deceptive
advertising-style consumer protection, employment pirotection or even anti-dumping style
protection against lower priced foreign products).  To the extent that respondents impute
the latter types of rneaning to  'unfair competition',  the indicator may fail to reflect the
intensity of competition or effectiveness of anti-trust policies.
We considered  three other policy  indicators.  PCONTROL  refers to  the  extent  to
which price controls are used throughout the economy on various goods and services.
Variables BUSFREE1 and BUSFREE2 reflect different tabulations of responses to the
question: "Are busirnesses  and co-operatives free to compete?'
Finally, we included two intensity of competition policy variables constructed on the
basis  of  confidlential  internal  assessments  by  'world  Bank  country  economists.
DISTRIBUTION  WB  reflects  the  extent  of  pro-competition  marketing  and  public
procurement policies; PRODUCT_WB reflects the extent that pro-competition product
market policies  and  anti-competitive behaviour by  enterprises is strictly  checked by  a
fully effective competition policy.  The appeal of these indicators is that they not only
reflect the judgement  of economists working  closely on specific  countkies but  also  a
careful effort to achieve internal consistency in rankings across countries.
Structural va!riables. A second set of qualitative and quantitative variables  reflects
the extent to which market structure is concentrated from an economy-wide perspective.
It is problematic to construct cross-country comparalble  industry concentration measures
in  light  of cross-co-untry differences  in relevant  market  definition, technology,  multi-
market contact and diversification of large companies, not to mention the overwhelming
data collection requirements.  Given these data challenges, the most informative variable
may  well  be  a  qualitative  variable,  MRKTDOM,  which  is  based  on  answers  from
Under  the  guidance of  Professor Sachs of  Harvard  University, the  traditional annual World
Competitiveness  Report (WCR) variables  were revised in 1996,  and resulted  in the compilation  of a new
Global  Competitiveness  Report series published  by World Economic  Forum. The ANT]:TRUST  variable
appears  for the first  time in this new  publication. The original  WVCR  was renamed  World Competitiveness
Yearbook,  and is nowv  published  exclusively  by IMD.
3business  executives to  the question "Do  you  agree that market  dominance by  a  few
companies  is  not  common  in  your  country?"  To  the  extent  that  this  indicator  is
negatively associated with  economy-wide concentration, it is expected to be  positively
associated with competition and growth.  The advantage of such a qualitative variable is
that it incorporates the country-specific judgement of high-level executives regarding the
relevant size of markets, the actual degree of market power facilitated by cross-company
industrial-financial  and  service sector ownership links,  and  other difficult  to  quantifyr
local factors.2
The extent of direct state involvement in the economy is generally expected to be
positively  associated  with  economy-wide  market  concentration,  as  state-owned
enterprises usually hold exclusive monopoly franchises or often have advantages such as
soft budget constraints to pre-empt entry.  We use two different measures of the relative
size of the state-owned sector as of 1985-SOE1  and SOE2. 3
Finally, in spite of all the conceptual and data limitations involved, we attempted to
construct  cross-country  comparable  economy-wide  concentration  ratios.  In  order  to
ensure  consistency  of  data  collection  across countries,  we based  the  indicators  on  a
recently  available  international  company  database  produced  by  Dun  &  Bradstreel:,
Principal  International  Businesses,  which  contains  data  on  some  90,000  largest
companies  ranging  all  sectors  of  the  economy  and  spanning  all  emerging  market
economies.  This database includes companies that make annual sales figures  publicly
available.  We calculated two economy-wide thirty-firm concentration ratios.  The first
variable, S30, gives the ratio of total domestic sales of the top  30 companies to GDP. 4
The  second  concentration  variable,  HERF30,  is  an  economy-wide  Herfindahl-based
concentration index, the sum of squares of the total sales shares in GDP for the largest 30
firms.  Unlike  an  average  of industry-level concentration  ratios, these  measures take
multi-market contact into account and avoid cross-country problems with the selection cf
representative sectors.
2 Nickell (1996) uses a similar  indicator  of the intensity  of competition  for individual  firms based on their
responses  to the question  "Do you have  more  than 5 competitors  in the market  for  your product(s)?"
3 SOE2 is included  as an alternate  measure  of the size of state enterprises  in the economy. In contrast to
SOEI, a higher rating indicates  that government  enterprises  play a less significant  role in the economy.
SOE2 is expected  therefore  to be positively  associated  with growth.
4 Since the database  does not include  the value of exports  for each firm,  we attempted  to separately  collect
this information  by  contacting local exporters association,  business magazines, government statistical
offices,  chambers  of commerce  and,  in some  cases,  the individual  firms. Based  on results for 20 countr:ies,
we decided to proxy domestic  sales by re-scaling  worldwide  company sales by national  exports since: (i)
information  on company  exports  was usually  based on surveys  conducted  on a random  sample  of firms and
not necessarily  carried  out every year; (ii) in some cases,  company  exports included  both  home and foreign
plant production;  (iii) the correlation  between  our  proxy and the more detailed  export accounting  was C.79
with  a p-value  of zero.
4Mobility variables.  A third set of measures attempts to capture enteiprise mobility,
that  is,  the  ease  wvith which  new  enterprises  canl enter  and  grow  in  any  market.5
ENTREPRENEUR  is  a proxy  for the relative  size of the entrepreneurial pool.  It  is
defined  as the  sihare of total  employers in  the  labour force, namely  owner-managers
working on their  own account or with one  or a few partners, making the operational
decisions affecting the enterprise, and engaging one or more persons to work for them in
their business.  T'o the extent that the relative size of the pool of owner-managers reflects
economy-wide ease of entry into markets (among other factors), it would be expected to
be positively associated with growth.
Our second mobility indicator, AGE25, is a variable that measures the average age of
25  of  the  largest  30  companies  by  sales  in  each  country  based  on  the  year  of
incorporation. 6 AGE25 should arguably be lower  in countries where  there  exists  the
potential for entrepreneurs with new ideas to start a new company that if successful could
become a major national player over time.  Perhaps the ideal  example is provided by
Microsoft Inc. in the United States. To the extent that lack of competitive pressure limits
turnover among the largest firms or that entry and expansion barriers prevent  smaller
innovative  firms  from  growing  into  larger  firms  over  time,  this  measure  should  be
negatively associated with growth.  As with other variables, it is important to emphasise
that this measure is at best  an imperfect proxy, given that incumbent large firms may
successfully  remain  large  over  time  in  a  sufficieintly competitive  environment  by
practices  such  as  aggressively  introducing  new  products,  constanitly  adopting
technological[ly  cost.-efficient practices and modifying their core business in response to
changing demands.
III.  Parsimonious but Robust Growth Models
The methodology  chosen  to  conduct  our  exercise  is  strictly  related  to  our  main
objective.  We want to determine the impact of indicators of intensity of economy-wide
competition  on  growth  and  to  provide  results  which  can be  regarded  as  general  as
possible, that is, which abstract from the specific sample size chosen or from industry,
sector or country-specific issues.  The methodology must also adequately deal with  the
fact  that we  have  fewer  observations of  our  competition variables  than of  the  more
standard  growth  variables.  The  smaller  subset  of  countries  that  each  competition
5  Although a range of variables related to turnover exist (capturing processes of entry and exit, variations
in  sizes  and  market  shares  of  continuing  business  units,  and  changes  in the  control  of  enterprises),
considerations cf data availability for a sufficiently large number of countries restricted our focus to the
reported measures.  C)n  other mobility measures and links with p:roductivity growth, see Caves (1998).
6  Observations on the year of incorporation were missing in an apparently non-systematic manner for a
small number of larger firms, which is the reason for limiting the variable to 25 of the largest 30 companies
for each country.
5indicator covers also varies.  To deal with this problem, we developed a parsimonious but
robust  methodology,  combining  the  2-stage OLS  analysis with  the  Extreme  Bounds
Analysis (EBA). Because the intensity of competition variables had not been compiled in
the past, we  cannot  construct panel  data.  This further restricts our  ability to use  the
framework of Mankiw  et al.  1992. Consequently, our only  alternative is to  use what
Temple  1999 calls "informal  growth regressions," with  innovative applications  of the
EBA.  We believe that our methodology allows us to use all available information in an
efficient manner.
Several issues have been thoroughly studied in the empirical literature on growth andL
for some of them a general agreement has been reached. 7 Table 2 describes the list of
potentially important growth variables, identified by past studies, that will be used at this
stage. 8 As dependent variable for all models, we use the average annual growth rate of
real  GNP  per  capita  (RGNP_G)  over  the period  1986-95.  We  focus  on  four  core
explanatory variables where there appears to be a reasonable degree of consensus:
*  Convergence: We include the pre-period log value of real GDP or GNP per capita, in
line  with  the  findings  that  higher  initial  levels  of  income  constrain  growth
possibilities, reflecting the catch-up potential by poorer nations.
*  Openness:  We include indices of trade openness or liberalisation, in line with  the
findings that  a  country's  outward  orientation  and trade  liberalisation  enhance  its
growth potential.
*  Human Capital: We include several variables reflecting the level of human capital
accumulation, both pre- and in-period, which have been found to favour growth.
*  Investment in Physical Capital:  "There is a robust correlation between investment
rates  and  growth...,"  Temple  (1999).  Accordingly,  we  use  the  share  of  Gross
Domestic Investment in GDP as an explanatory variable.
7  For a survey of studies  focusing  on the politics of growth,  income,  consumption  distribution  and fiscal
policy, see Alesina  and Perotti (1997); for studies  focusing  on "catching-up"  or mean convergence,  human
capital and  production  factor  accumulation,  see Barro  (1991, 1997,  1998),  Baumol  (1986),  De Long (1988),
Hansson and Henrekson (1997), Jones (1995), Lucas (1988), Mankiw (1995), Mankiw et al.  (1992),
Romer (1990), Young (1995); for a study focusing on schooling,  see Summer and Heston (1988); for
studies focusing  on financial  development  see Bencivenga  and Smith (1991), Greenwood  and Jovanovic
(1990), King and Levine (1993), Levine (1991); for studies focusing  on economic  openness, see Dollar
(1992),  Harrison  (1996), Sachs  and Warner  (1995).
8  Note that some variables  thought to have an important  explanatory  power in growth models, such as
schooling-related  measures,  are not considered  at this stage. The reason for their absence  is related to the
fact that the sample of these  variables  only partially  overlaps  with the other  growth  variables. Their use at
this  stage  would  have considerably  reduced  the number  of countries  taken into consideration,  with negative
effect on the efficiency of our estimates.  These variables will be used later on smaller samples, when the
correlation between growth and competition variables is tested.
6Each one of ourT  growth models have two "core" variables belonging to two of these
four groups (see Table 2 for the definitions of variables):
Model 1:  RGNP_G; - a,  +  LGDP85i P1i  + SACWAR9Si,  P21 +  Uil
Model 2:  RGNP_G;  = cc 2 +  LGDP85i  112 + GD195i  P22 +  Ui2
Model 3:  RGNP_Gi = a3 +  LGDP85i 113 + LLIFEM85i 1323  + Ui3
Model  4:  RGNP_Gi  = a4 +  SACWAR95i  114 +  GD195i  124 +  Uj4
Model 5:  RGNP_Gi  = a5 +  SACWAR95i 115  + LLIFEM85i 125 +  Ui5
Model 6:  RGNP_G; = OC6  + GDI95i P16  +  LLIFEM85i  326  +  Ui6
To ensure parsimony, we augmented these models only with variables that passed a
modified version of a robustness test based on EBA. 9 The robustness test for including
variable I in Model k is conducted as follows.  We add I and a rotating set of three other
variables (denoted by Z) as regressors to Model k above.
RGNP_GCi  = (xk  - Xi,k  + Ii PI + Zi  z + Uik
We therl run this regression with all possible sets of Z-variables to find the extreme
bounds  (i.e., maximum  and minimum)  for the  estimate  of  /3,.10  If  the  estimate  is
significant at both extreme bounds, variable I is coinsidered  to be a robust variable.  We
repeat this exercise for all six models and for all variables listed in Table 2.1  l  The results
are reported  in  Table  3.  Each  cell  in  Table  3  reports  the minimum  and maximum
estimates of the coefficient of the variable of interest and their significance levels for the
model indicated at the top of the column.  Robust variables are identified by the shaded
cells.  For the purposes of this exercise, we used the same set of 83 observations that are
common to all variables included in our investigation.  We also created a seventh model
by using the variables that appear in at least two of the six regressions.  We report the
results from these seven regression models in Table 4.
9 See  Edward  Leamner  (1983) for  a  general  discussion of  EBA  and  Levine  and  Rernelt (1992)  for  an
application to cross.-country  growth regressions.
10  The pool of Z-variables varies according to which model and variable of interest we are considering.  For
instance: wherL  the variable of interest is POPG95 in model 4, Z variables are chosen from the following
set:  {LGNP85,  GDFI95,  LLIFET85,  LLIFEF85,  LFERT,  LPOP85,  XGDP95,  MGDP95,  OPEN95,
BUDG95, TA'K95, INFL95, GD195, LLIFEM85, FAREAST, OIL, TRANS, LATIN, AFRICA}.
1  l We disregard results from regressions that exhibit significan: multicollinearity, as evidenced by having a
variance inflation factor greater than 10.  Chatterjee and Price (1991) provide a definition of the variance
inflation factor and  a discussion for selecting a cut-off  level.  Although the EBA, with this  screen, can
potentially include imore variables as being robust, the use of the screen (lid not have a material effect on
our results.
7Note that Model 4 is nested in Model 2.  Moreover, it is the only model that fails the
Ramsey test for functional mis-specification and the Jarque-Berra test for the normality
of the residuals.  We therefore disregard Model 4 for the rest of our analysis.
According to the applications of the J-test (Davidson and MacKinnon  1981) and the
Cox-Pesaran-Deaton test (Pesaran and Deaton 1978) Model  1 appears to be better than
Models 6 and 7; and Model 3 than Models 5, and 7. But the tests concerning other binary
comparisons were inconclusive.  Of these models, all explanatory variables of Model  7
are measured before the period.  The only in-period variable in Models  1 and 5 is the
openness variable, which reflects the reform efforts rather than ex post growth.  The other
models  include  in-period  investment variables,  measured  as  the relative  intensity  of
investment (e.g., average investment-to-GDP ratio) rather than the absolute amount of
investment.  Therefore, they are not so much subject to the usual endogeneity criticism.
IV. Intensity  of Competition  and Unexplained  Growth
Our primary aim is to study the strength of association between intensity of economy-
wide  competition and  growth.  In  order to accommodate the fact that  we have fewer
observations of our competition variables than of the more standard growth variables and
that we would like to use all available information as efficiently as possible, we test for
the  correlation  between  our  competition  variables  and  the residuals  from  our  robust
growth models.
In our attempt to utilise as much information as possible, we also have extended the
growth models  1, 2  and  5 to  the maximum number of  available  observations.  This
approach is justified  because,  as reported in Table 5, these models remain stable with
respect to the extension whereas the others do not.  We also have checked and report in
Table 5 whether the statistical properties of all models apply to smaller sets of countries
for which competition variables are available.  We use these test results in evaluating the
reliability of our conclusions.
In the second stage of our analysis, we test whether any of our competition variables
exhibit  a robust  correlation with  residual  growth rates.  As  some  of  our  qualitative
competition variables  arguably could reflect institutional  factors not  directly related to
intensity  of  competition,  we have  compiled an  additional  list of variables  that  could
potentially explain growth to control for such factors.  These variables are described i.n
Table 6.  We include them at this stage, instead of the first stage for two reasons:
*  These variables, unlike the ones used in building our parsimonious growth models, do
not have as solid an established link to growth in the existing literature.
*  They represent alternative hypotheses to our investigation.  For example, one could
argue that the ANTITRUST variable reflects general institutional quality rather than
the more focused government efforts to foster competition.  Were this alternative true,
8we would expect the institutional quality variable, INSTITQUALITY, to exhibit  as
strong a link to r  esidual growth as ANTITRUST.
Variables that  appear to be  correlated with unexplained growth.  We report  the
correlation between the competition variables (and alternatives to compet:ition variables)
and residual growth in Table 7.  Only correlation coefficients significant at 10 percent are
shown  (starred coeifficients are significant at 5 percent).  ANTITRUST and its  earlier
version, UN1FAIR,  appear as top performers, but they are not alone.
Competition policy  variables by  far exhibit the highest  degree of correlation  with
residual growth tharn  any other group. Besides ANTITRUST and UNFAIR.,  PCONTROL
and DISTRIBUT  ION_WB are significant at the 5 percent  level in at least one model.
Among the structural variables,  MRKTDOM and SOE2 have significarLt  and positive
correlations  with  residual  growth,  supporting  the  hypothesis  that  more  competitive
economies  tend  to  have  higher  growth  rates.  Mobility  variables  too,  despite  their
tentative nature, show some correlation with residual growth.  These results support our
belief that thiere should be more serious efforts to collect and compile international data
on  measures  of  corporate  and  entrepreneurial  mobility.  Two  of  the  alternative-to-
competition variables appear to have significant correlation with residual growth.  One of
them reflects the quality of environmental policies and regulations, and the other that of
general policy  making.  These variables  are not  correlated  with  ANT:[TRUST; they
probably reflect other factors than competition policy.  However, in our  second stage
EBA analysis reported below, their correlations with residual growth are not robust.
Tests of robustiess.  In interpreting the correlations in Table 7, we  should keep in
mind the fragility of cross-country statistical relationships as noted by Levine and Renelt
(1992).  It is the:refore important to test their robustness.  We once again use the EBA,
treating each variable in Table 7 as a variable of interest.  We thus determine whether
controlling for different sets of factors weakens the raw correlation with residual growth.
The techniqu;e is similar to the one previously described with  the difference that now,
there are no core vaxiables and the rotating set of "other" variables is restricted to only
two  variables  due to  sample size concerns. For  each variable in  Table  7, we  run  all
possible regressions with two additional variables chosen froim the pool of variables  in
Tables 1 and 6.  The results of this EBA are reported in Table 8 where each cell shows
the maximurn and  mninimum  coefficient  estimate for the variable of interest  and  their
significance levels.  Only the shaded cells have both extreme bounds significant at 10
percent.
Our analysis identifies a relatively robust relationship with growth for ANTITRUST
and to a lesser degree for UNFAIR and AGE25.  Only the extreme bounds of these three
variables  remain  significant at  10 percent  level thrDughout the rotations  of  additional
explanatory variables  for at least one model.  ANTITRUST and  UNFAIR have robust
9correlations with the residuals of models 1 and 3 which are, as discussed above, superior
to models 5, 6,  and 7.  Moreover, models  1 and 3 could be  reliably restricted  to the
sample  size of  these variables.  All other  associations are  eliminated in  our  test  for
robustness.  In particular, the variables reflecting institutional quality that had significant
raw correlations with growth are not robust.
Moreover,  these  three  variables  complement  one  another  in  explaining  growth:
AGE25  is  robust  in  the  only  model  where  ANTITRUST  is  not.  In  models  where
ANTITRUST is the most robust (models 5 and 6), UNFAIR is not robust at all.  In fact,
UNFAIR  is  the  predecessor  of  ANTITRUST  and  emphasises  the  effectiveness  of
competition  policy  in  dealing  with  unfair  practices rather  than  its  ability  to  prevenl
explicitly anti-competitive practices.
AGE25 is robust in only one model, Model 2, which could be reliably restricted to the
sample size of AGE25.  Model 2's unique feature is the absence of the Far East dummy.
As we argue below, the link between competition and growth appears to be most tenuous
in that region, and hence the poor showing of ANTITRUST and UNFAIR for Model 2..
However, AGE25 captures the youthfulness of the leading companies in this region.  For
all Far East Asian countries except Philippines, AGE25 is below the sample median.
Based  on  these  EBA  findings  reported  in  Table  8,  the  correlation  between
ANTITRUST and growth is robust.  The size of the coefficient,  varying between 0.28,
and  0.47,  implies  that  the  link between  active promotion  of  competition  policy  ancl
growth may be economically important.  Although causality cannot be inferred from our
analysis,  a  1-point increase in  the perceived  effectiveness of antitrust  enforcement  is
associated with an increase of about 0.4 percentage points in the annual growth rate.
Causality.  Not  surprisingly, ANTITRUST appears with  a positive  and  significant
sign  when  included  as  an  additional  regressor  in  any  of  the  cross-country  growth
regressions that we tested.  Although the association between  ANTITRUST and long-
term growth is irrefutable, the causal link between ANTITRUST and long-term growth
cannot  be  established  in  a  simple  regression  analysis  because  ANTITRUST  is
simultaneously  determined  with  growth.  The  same  simultaneity  problem  applies  tLo
SACWAR95.  An application of an instrumental variable technique for each one of the
three variables provides some support for the hypothesis that each variable has a distinct
causal effect on long-term growth.
For the instrumental variables approach, it is  necessary to  create a model with only
exogenous variables except for the endogenous variable for which instruments are used.
Model  7  augmented  by  one  of  the  endogenous  variables  satisfies  that  requirement:.
Instrumental  variables  for  the  endogenous  variable  are  selected  from  the  categories
identified in Table 2.  All instrumental variables measure pre-period values (i.e., 1985)
and thus are exogenous.
10The best instruments for ANTITRUST appear to be terms of trade in 1985, growth in
government consumnption  (three-year average as of 1985), and population in 1985.  With
these  instrumentls, ANTITRUST retains  its  significance as  a  regressor.  Using  other
indicators  of fiscal health  as instrumental variables,  instead of  growth  in government
consumption,  retains  the  same  results  at  somewhat weaker  significance  levels.  A
relatively  advantageous  foreign  trade  position,  a  large  domestic  marLet,  and  small
government appear ito  be conducive to meaningful antitrust enforcement.
On the other hand, the best instruments for the trade opernmess  index, SACWAR95,
appear to be exports (as a percentage of the GDP in 1985), population growth (three-year
average as of 1985), and inflation in  1985.  Rather perversely, inflation appears to have
positive  correlation with  SACWAR95.  One plausible  explanation  would be  that  high
inflation coumtries in  1985 were  mostly  Latin  American  countries  that  subsequently
opened up their economies in the 1990s. However, after controlling for inflation and life
expectancy (another significant determinant of SACWAR95), Latin American countries
have  lower  SACWAR95  values.  Considering  that  politics  in  practice  appears  to
dominate a country"s decision to open up its markets, the strange mix of these variables
should not be surprising.
A  closer  look  at  individual  countries.  We  can identify  four  distrnct  groups  of
relatively  comparable  countries  for  which  we  have  ANTITRUST  observations.
Exploring the competition and growth link among thiem is instructive for understanding
both the source and shortcomings of our results.  Findings are reported in Table 9.
The three  Latin  American  Southern  Cone countries have  the same  rankings  with
respect to both ANTITRUST and growth residuals (Panel A).  During this period, Chile
was the leading  reformer  in Latin  America, buildirig a cornpetitive economy  through
privatisation and deregulation.  Other macro and trade policies moved roughly in tandem
in  these  three  colmtries,  with  Chile  following  a  more  cautious  capital  account
liberalisation and achieving  stabilisation earlier than the others.  Yet  all these macro
factors are controlled for in the models and in the EB A analysis.
Similarly, there  is  almost  a  perfect  correlation between  competition  and  growth
among the peripheral members of the European Union (Panel B).  Most observers would
likely agree that the  Irish or the Portuguese  business environment has been far  more
competitive than that of Greece during the period under investigation.  It is reasonable to
postulate that lack of competition is one of the leading explanations for Greece's  sub-par
growth performance.
For the group of small European economies, toD, there is a very strong correlation
between ANTITRUST and growth (Panel C).  What is interesting is that for the so-called
Asian  tigers,  this  correlation  disappears  (Panel  D). These  findings  suggest  that  the
11effectiveness of  competition  policy  may  not  be  uniform  across  different  groups  of
countries.
One contentious issue is whether there is any role for competition policy beyond trade
liberalisation  in  a  small open  economy.  We have  several  findings  that  confirm  the
plausibility of such a role.  First, Models 1, 2, and 5 explicitly control for trade openness
and their residuals still show a robust correlation with ANTITRUST.  Second, alternate
measures of trade openness appear in the EBA procedures and they do not appear to be
weakening the correlation between growth and ANTITRUST.  Third, the instrumental
variables approach, discussed above, shows that ANTITRUST and SACWAR95 impact
growth through different channels.  Finally, the link between ANTITRUST and growth
appears to  be  more  significant  for  small  open  economies  in  Europe.  Our  findings
therefore  suggest  a  strong  complementary role  for  competition  policy  in  stimulating
growth beyond trade liberalisation and international openness.
V.  Conclusion
Despite difficulties and data problems, we have developed different sets of variables
that measure the intensity of economy-wide competition.  We then created traditional and
robust cross-country growth models and explored the correlations between competition
variables and residual growth rates.
Our results  indicate that there is  a strong correlation between the  effectiveness of
competition  policy  and  growth.  We  tested  the  robustness  of  this  relationship  by
controlling for other  factors that arguably may be  proxied by  our  competition policy
variables.  The relationship appears to be robust.  Our analysis suggests that the effect of
competition on growth goes beyond that of trade liberalisation, institutional quality, and ;a
generally favourable policy environment. However, this link appears to be more tenuous
for Far Eastern economies.  This observation cautions us against being overly simplistic
in  promoting  the  importance  of  competition  policy  as  a  major  and  independent
determinant of long-run growth.  It suggests that there remains  ample scope for further
empirical work in this area.  Given the tentative but promising links between mobility-
related variables  and growth, there  should in particular be  more  systematic efforts  to
collect  and  compile  internationally-comparable  data  on  measures  of  corporate  and
entrepreneurial mobility.
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15Table 1. Measures of Intensity of Economy-Wide  Competition
Variables  Definition  Period  Source (1)  #obs.  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
ANTITRUST  Anti-trust or anti-monopoly policy effectively  promotes competition (2)  1996  GCR  52  0.7921  2.130  5.470
BUSFREEI  Are businesses  and co-operatives  free to compete? (3)  Average  EFW  115  2.1252  2.500  10.000
BUSFREE2  Are businesses and co-operatives  free to compete? (3)  Average  FH  115  2.1344  2.500  10.000 94-95
Policypeariables  DISTRIBUTION_WB  State intervention in marketing and public procurement  systems (4)  1997  PREM  130  0.8225  1.000  5.000
PCONTROL  Extent of price controls on various goods and services (5)  Average  EFW  112  2.2475  0.000  9.500
89-95
PRODUCT_WB  State intervention in product markets (6)  1996  PREM  130  0.7686  1.000  5.000
UNFAIR  Do anti-trust laws prevent unfair competiton in your country? (7)  Average  WCRIWCY  49  1.0818  2.197  6.902
89-96
MRKTDOM  Market  dominance by a few companies  is not common (2)  1996  GCR  52  0.7802  2.000  5.480
S30  Concentration  ratio of top 30 firms ranked  by domestic sales over GDP  1996  D&B  53  0.2297  0.009  0.932
Structural  HERF30  Herfindahl  index of top 30 firms by sales (shares of GDP)  1996  D&B  59  19.2477  0.001  87.486
Variables
SOEI  SOE value added as % of GDP (8)  1985  WD198  49  0.0774  0.006  0.350
SOE2  Size of govemment  enterprises in the economy (9)  1985  EFW  103  2.3569  0.000  10.000
Mobility  AGE25  Average age of 25 firms within the top 30 firms ranked by total sales  1996  D&B  42  14.2192  9.000  71.160
Variables  ENTREPRENEUR  Share of owner-managers  in labour force  Average  ILO  43  0.1433  0.003  0.639
Notes:
(1) D&B: Dun & Bradstreet (1997) (with company data on largest companies by employment, based on stock exchanges, employment bureaus, ministries of labor, post offices,
manufacturing  censuses and surveys); EFW: Economic Freedom of the World, Gwartney et.al. (1997); FH: Freedom House (1996); GCR: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness
Report  (1996); ILO: International Labour  Organisation (1996); PREM: Poverty Reduction  and Economic Management Network, "Country Policy and Institutional  Assessment",
The World Bank (confidential intemal assessments by staff economists,  various years); WCRIWCY: IMD, World Competitiveness Report(to 1995)/ World Competitiveness Yearbook (1996);
WD198:  World  Development Indicators, The World Bank (1998).
(2) 1= strongly disagree to  7 = strongly agree
(3) The higher the rating the greater the freedom to compete (10 = countries  for which businesses and cooperatives were most free to compete).  EFW modified the original FH survey
team ranking by reducing the rating for several countries  based on EFW's substantial evidence that the FH rating was overly generous.
(4) 1 = widespread  interventions with state marketing monopolies  over agriculture and exports; 3 = some entry/exit barriers with reform program underway; 5 = no marketing monopolies,
pro-competition  public procurement system in place
(5) 0 = widespread  use of price controls throughout economy; 10 = no price controls, more than 90 percent of companies  can set prices freely
(6) 1 = widespread  price interventions and reservation policies  for selected products; 3 = progress towards price decontrol and full cost recovery for utilities, with effective implementation
of competition policy;  5 = no price controls, full cost recovery, anti-cornpetitive  behavior  by firms strictly checked
(7) 0 = strongly disagree  to 10 = strongly agree
(8) Value  added of state enterprises  is estimated as their sales revenue minus the cost of their intermediate inputs, or the sum of their operating surplus and wage payments.
(9) 0 = economy  dominated by SOEs (employment and output in SOEs exceeds 30% of total non-agricultural employment/output); 10 = very few SOEs, less than 1  % of country's output_ Table  2. Variables  Used  in Parsimorious  Growth  Models
Std.
Variable  Definition  Period  Source  (1)  # obs Dev.  Min  Max
long-run  growth rgrp_g  Real  GNP  per  capita  growth  (annual  %)  Average  WD198  161  0.04  -0.14  0.09
86-95
Igdp85  Log  of GDP  per  capita  (constant  1987  US$)  1985  WD198  153  1.44  4.31 10.14
convergence
Ignp85  Log  of GNP  per  capita  (constant  1987  US$)  1985  WD198  148  1.45  4.43 10.23
mgdp95  Imports  of goods  and  services  (%  of GDP)  Average  WD198  172  0.26  0.04  1.77
86-95
open95  Import  plus  export  (%  GDP)  Average  WD198  172  0.48  0.06  3.64
openness  86-95
sacwar9!5  Sachs  and  Wamer  openess  index  Average  SW  108  0.44  0.00  1.00
86-93
xgdp95  Exports  of  goods  and  services  (%  of GDP)  Average  WD198  172  0.25  0.02  1.87
86-95
Ifert85  Fertility  rate,  total  (births  per  woman)  1985  WD198  187  0.52  0.31  2.19
Ilifef85  Log  of life  expectancy  at birth,  female  (years)  1985  WD198  187  0.20  3.63  4.39
human  capital
llifem85  Log  of life  expectancy  at birth,  male  (years)  1985  WD198  187  0.19  3.55  4.31
llifct85  Log  of life  expectancy  at birth,  total  (years)  1985  WD198  187  0.20  3.59  4.35
gdfi95  Gross  domestic  fixed  investment  (% of GDP)  9verage  WD198  170  0.09  0.09  0.69
investment  6-
gdi95  Gross  domestic  investment  (%  of GDP)  Avera  WD98  172  0.09  0.09  0.69
86-95
budg95  Overall  budget  deficit,  induding  grants  (% of  GDP)  Ave  rage  WDI98  128  0.05  -0.25  0.32
86-95  9  2  .5-.503
fscal policy  infl95  Inflation,  consumer  prices  (annual  %)  Average  WD198  140  2.71  -0.03 27.13
tax95  Tax revenue  (%  of GDP)  Average  WD198  130  0.10  0.00  0.47
86-95
Ipop85  Log  of population,  total  1985  WD198  200  2.11  10.52 20.77
population
popg95  Population  growth  (annual  %)  Average  WD198  200  0.01  -0.01  0.06
africa  Sub-saharhan  countries  Average  209  0.40  0.00  1.00
86-95
fareast  East  Asia  dummy  209  0.19  0.00  1.00
dummies  latlin  Latin  Amrican  country  dummy  dummy  209  0.31  0.00  1.00
oil  Oil  producing  countries  dummy  209  0.31  0.00  1.00
trans  Transitional  economies  East  Europe  dummy  209  0.33  0.00  1.00
Notes:
(1) SW:  Sachs  and  Warner  (1995);  WD198:  World  Development  Indicators,  The  World  Bank  (1998).Table  3. Results  of the EBA  Analysis  for Growth-Related  Variables
Ml  M2  M3  M4  MS  M6
significance  significance  significance  significance  significance  significance
coefficent  level  coefficient  level  coefficient  level  coefficient  level  coefficient  level  coefficient  level
lgdPmS  -O.i  4  a  ..  ..  . ..  -0.018  0%  0  0  01  0%
nM  -0002  a  8%  -0.009  1%  -0>000  2ax
gdn95  mli  0.083  6%  01  8%  ..  )  ..  na  0.006  39  %a  na .0  sacwar95
Max  0.028  0%  35  O  n  . 0.023  0na
IlHe5  min  0.071  0.068  13%  0.0300.071  l0%
Max  0.231  0%  0.198  0%  na  .a  0223  0%
llifet85  mli  0.037  6%  0.037  6%  na  ,a  -0.012  56%  na
Max  0.124  0%  0,114  0%  .a  na  0.096  0%  na
fgnp8as  mini  na  na  nas  na  na  nas  -0.016  %  O  0,020  0  -0.0  :0
Max  na  itsa  it  na  na  it  -0.0o2  27%  o  -0.00
gdfI95  min  0.08  53%  its  93%  0.000  7%  0a  2ts  0.084  1093%  ita  i
Max  0.235  00  O  it  is  0.  207  0%  na  it  0.221  0%  na  it
llIfefBs  mlin  0.030  14%  0.030  14%  na  it  -0.024  34%  its  it  it  i
Max  0.120  0%  0.110  0%  na  it  0.095  O%  its  its  it  its
lifet:5  min  0.037  O%  0.037  1%  its  its  -0.013  51%  its  it  na  its
Max  0.124  0%  0.114  0%  na  ns  0.098  O,%  its02  its  is  6
fareast  rnint  *  17  0.014  14%  0>4  0.017  5%  O.021  1%  0093
Max  .040  0%  0.034  0%  4.047  0%  0.033  0%  0.038  0%  -0.04  0%
ffert85  m'itt  -. 5  %  -. 4  0  002  0  -0.044  0%  -0.040  0%  -0.039  0%
Max  0.02  83%  -0.00  7%  -0.022  0%  0.014  15%  0.002  87%  0.009  43%
lipop85  min  0.001  53%  0.000  93%  0.000  79%  0.002  23%  0.001  53%  0.000  93%
Max  0.009  3%  0.006  0%  0.006  0%  0.007  0%  0.008  0%  0.006  0%
popg95  mlin  -16480  0%A  -1.528  0%  -1.28  0  -1.412  0%  -1.142  0%  -1.256  0%
Max  0.368  38%  0.047  90%  -057  5  -0.364  71%  -0.104  82%  -0.371  38%
olt  min  -0.020  0%  -0.019  1%  -0.011  12%  -0.019  0%  -0.021  0%  -0.018  0%
Max  0.002  7738  0.001  3%  0.003  67%  -0.002  72%  0.002  77%  -0.001  88%
trans  min  -0.040  7h  -0.047  Wo  -0.047  0%  -0.038  O%  -0.038  0%  -0.044  0%
Max  0.004  83%  -0.005  73%  -0.016  35%  -0.002  88%  0.011  51%  -0.002  88%
xqdp9  m5  i  -0.022  4/  -0.013  3%  -0.019  O,%  -0.014  2%  -0.020  0%  -0.013  2%
Max  0.006  39%  0.012  7%.  0.001  90%  0.007  21%  0.007  27%  0.008  20%
africa  min  -0.030  0%  -0.023  O.  -0.009  23%  -0.021  O%  -0.014  13%  -0.008  34%
Max  0.006  38%  0.007  34%  0.008  31%  -0.016  12%  0.007  40%  0.008  33%
mgdp95  min  -0.020  97%  -0.021  %  -0.009  35%  -0.080  1%  -0.019  8%  -0.019  8%
Max  0.039  0%  0.020  11%  0.040  0%  0.017  18%  0.038  0%  0.019  13%
xgdp95  min  -0.011  32%  -0.015  191%  -0.004  69%  -0.016  12%  -0.014  13%  -0.015  15%
Max  0.043  0%  0.025  31%  0.042  O%  0.083  2%  -0.013  21%  0.021  4%
open95  min  -0.007  19%  -0.009  16o  -0.003  49%  -0.009  9%  -0.008  14%  -0.009  10%
Max  0.021  0%  0.012  6%  0.021  0%  0.010  7%  0.019  37%  0.010  10%
budg95  mlin  -0.002  97%  -0.002  97%  0.039  48%  -0.010  87%1  0.016  76%1  0.018  76%
Max  0.255  O%  0.208  O,/  0.275  0%  0.162  1%  0.252  O,/  0.186  0%
tax95  mlin  -0.081  1%  -0.047  11%  -0.085  1%  -0.091  01%  -0.135  0%  -0.089  0%
Max  0.063  9%1  0.088  1%  0.060  8%  0.048  14%  0.032  29%  0.044  14%
IFi'IBS  mlin  -0.002  1%  -0.002  09%  -0.002  1%  -0.002  0%/  -0.002  1%  -0.002  0%
Max  -0.001  43%  -0.001  7%  -0.001  41%  -0.001  6%  -0.001  37%/  -0.001  6%Table 4. Parsimonious  Growth  Models
Ml  M2  M3  M4  M5  M6  M7
significance  significance  significance  significance  significance  significance  significance
Regressors  coefficient  level  coefficient  level  coefficient  level  coefficient  level  coefficient  level  coefficient  level  coefficient  level
convergence:  lgdpB5  -0.014  0%  -0.015  0%  -0.013  0%
Ignp85  -0.010  0%  -0.008  0%  -0.013  0%
human capital:  Ilifem85  0.055  0%  0.046  2%  0.061  0%  0.083  0%  0.087  0%  0.061  0%
Ifert85  -0.024  0%  -0.028  0%  -0.020  8%  -0.028  0%
openness;  sacwar95  0.016  0%  0.016  1%  0.017  0%  0.019  0%
investment:  gdi95  0.143  0%  0.204  0%  0.092  4%
gdfi95  0.113  1%
fareast  0.032  0%/  0.022  1%  0.037  0%  0.029  0%  0.034  0%
constant  -0.087  25%  -0.065  40%  -0.133  10%  -0.040  0%  -0.260  0%  -0.302  0%  -0.105  18%
statistics
F-testforjointsignificance:  F(5,77)  25.430 F(5,77)  24.150 F(6,76)  20.070 F(2,80)  26.210  F(4,78)  25.650  F(4,78)  22.390  F(4,78)  27.440
R-square:  0.623  0.611  0.613  0.396  0.568  0.535  0.585
Adjusted R-square:  0.598  0.585  0.583  0.381  0.546  0.511  0.563
Standarderroroftheregression:  0.016  0.016  0.016  0.020  0.017  0.018  0.017Table 5. Goldfeld-Quandt  Test for Variance Constancy  with Respect to Sample Size Restrictions
Ho:  Model  cannot  be extended  to the  largest  possible  sample  size.
Model  test  statistic  distribution  probability
Ml  1.18  F(13,77)  0.31
M2  1.33  F(12,77)  0.22
M3  2.99  F(45,76)  0.00
M5  1.05  F(14,78)  0.42
M6  2.38  F(48,78)  0.00
M7  2.96  F(51,78)  0.00
Ho:  Model  cannot  be restricted  to the  set of  observations  where  ANTITRUST,  UNFAIR  and  MRKTDOM  are  available.
Model  test statistic  distribution  probability
Ml  1.59  F(52,39)  0.07
M2  1.22  F(51,38)  0.22
M3  1.67  F(34,36)  0.06
M5  1.43  F(53,40)  0.12
M6  1.57  F(36,38)  0.09
M7  2.06  F(36,38)  0.02
HO:  Model  cannot  be restricted  to the  set of observations  where  S30,  HERF30  and  AGE25  are  available.
Model  test statistic  distribution  probability
Ml  1.75  F(59,32)  0.04
M2  1.45  F(57,32)  0.13
M3  1.75  F(42,28)  0.06
M5  1.53  F(60,33)  0.09
M6  1.96  F(44,30)  0.03
M7  1.91  F(44,30)  0.03
Ho:  Model  cannot  be restricted  to  the  set of observations  where  BD-based  (1)  alternative-to-competition  variables  are
available.
Model  test  statistic  distribution  probability
Ml  1.66  F(58,32)  0.06
M2  1.43  F(58,31)  0.14
M3  2.11  F(46,23)  0.03
M5  1.22  F(59,33)  0.27
M6  1.39  F(48,25)  0.19
M7  2.19  F(48,25)  0.02
Ho:  Model  cannot  be restricted  to the  set of observations  where  ENTREPRENEUR  is  available.
Model  test statistic  distribution  probability
Ml  1.38  F(65,25)  0.19
M2  1.32  F(64,25)  0.22
M3  1.05  F(46,23)  0.47
Ms  1.66  F(66,26)  0.08
M6  1.53  F(48,25)  0.13
M7  1.20  F(48,25)  0.32
Note: BD: Burnside and Dollar (1997). These altemative-to-competition  variables includes  ASSAS, CIVLIB,
ETHNFRCT, INSTITQUALITY  and POLICY (for definitions, see Table 6).Table  E.  Definitions  of  Additional  Variables  Used  in the  Second  Stage  EBA
Variable  Definition  Period  Source  (1)  Obs  Std Dev.  Min  Max
ASSAS  Number  of assasinatons  Average 86-  BD  71  0.7685  0.000  4.125
93
CMVILIB  Civil liberhes  11985  BD  70  1.3545  1.000  7.000
CORRUPT  CoIruption inclex  (0 to 6, high to low)  1985  ICRG  126  1.2320  1.000  6.000
ENVRNMNT_WB Environmental  policies and regulations (2)  11998  PREM  135  0.8750  1.000  5.000
ETHNFRCT  Ethnic fractionalisation  index  Average 86-  BD  68  29.895  0.000  93.000
93
INSTITQUALITY  Instituional quality  Average 86-  BD  64  1.4026  2.270  8.560
93
PATENTS  Number  of patents granted  11995  WIPO  93  1.8E+04  0.000  1.1E+05
POLICY  Economic policy index  Aver3ge 86-  BD  92  1.2834  -3.230  4.030
933
RULE WB  Private economic activity is facilitated by a rule-based  1997  PREM  130  0.8155  1.000  4.670
govemance structure (3)
corruptavg  Coiruption inclex  (0 to 6, high to low)  Average 86-  GRG  126  1.3126  0.450  6.000
95
crpriv95  Credit to private sector (% of GDP)  Average 86-  WDI98  166  0.3156  0.002  1.943
95
govc95  Genri.  government consumption  (% of GDP)  Average 86-  WD198  169  0.0698  0.055  0.493
95
govcgY5  Geri. government consumption  growth (% of GDP)  Average 86-  WD198  167  0.0687  -0.340  0.521 95
land85  Land (SqKm)  1985  WD198  173  1.5E+06  20.000  9.3E+06
m1m295  M1/M2 ratio  Aver3ge 86-  WD198  165  0.2004  0.086  0.944 95
m295  Money and quasi money (M2)  as % of GDP  Average 86-  WD198  163  0.2735  0.002  1.604 95
m395  Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of GDP  Average 86-  WD198  164  0.2860  0.003  1.715
m3ml  Quasi-liquid liabilities (% of GDP)  Average 86-  WD198  164  0.2771  0.001  1.562
prim2585  Percentage of primary  school attained  in male  1385  BL  110  0.1695  0.073  0.740 population  oldier  than  25
pyrm2585  Average years of primary schooling  in the male  1385  BL  110  1.8493  0.610  8.020
population aged 25 and over
shpuppB5  Ratio of Cgov.  current educaton expend. per primary  1985  BL  90  0.0851  0.029  0.449
school  puJpii  t)  per capita GDP
spread95  Interest rate spread (lending  rate minus deposit rate)  Average 86-  WD198  144  1.4944  -0.029  16.939
Notes:
(1) BD: Bumside and Dollar (1997); BL: Barro  and Lee (1996); WD198:  The World Bank (1998); ICRG: Intemational Countty Risk Guide,
The Political Risk Services Group (1998); PREM: confidential  intemal assessments  by staff economists,  The World Bank; WIPO: Worid
Intellectual Property Organisation (1997).
(2) on a 1-6 scale where 2 = no policies or investments  for sustainable  manage  -nent of natural resourcs or pollution control, regulations
inadequate  or weakly enforced; 5 = comprehensive policies accompanied  by credible enforcement  capadity  to sustainably manage key natu
resources, regulations consistent with intemational norms implemented  effectivsly
(3) on a 1-5 scale where I = laws and regulations lack certainty and applicaton lacks predictability,  property rights not well-defined or enfor
3 = credible reform process underway,  limited discretion; 5 = well-functioning legal and regulatory  system with low transactions costs, confli
of interest regulations for pu"blic  servants strictly enforced.Table 7. Correlation  Matrix for Residuals  and Competition  Variables
residuals  from
Ml  M2  M3  M5  M6  M7
Variables  #  of  obs.  102  101  83  102  83  83
. ^.jfl1  52  0.2826  0.3891*  0.3815*  0.4870*  0.3474*
BU$FR~~~~E1  ~115  0.1758  0.1854
BUSFREE2  ~~~~~15  0.1775  0.1903 Competition  130  O.2128*
Policy  Variables  I  =.  130  0.2128* POONROL  112  0.2517*  0.2237*  0.2990*  0.2142*
PRODUCTMRKT_WB  130
lJFAIR  lXs2  49  0.2626  0.5091*  O.4379*  0.4692*
MgRKW  52  0.2738  0.3390*
830  53
Structural  HeRP3O  X  00>  559  0.2531 Variables
SOEI  49
0E  103  0.2048  0.2348*  0.1944
Mobility  Variables  A2  42  -0.3031  -0.2920
; TREPRENEUR  43  0.3555*  0.2793  0.3239
ASSAS  71
CIVILLIB  70
Alternative  CORRUPT  124
variables  that  R  U  P  130  0.2004  0.3030*  0.3295*  O.3794*
could  potentially  ETHNFRCT  68
explain  residual INSTITQUALITY  64
growth  PATENTS  93
POLICY  94  0.2454  0.2626*  0.2553*  0.2666*
RULE  WB  130
Note: Table shows correlations  that are significant  at 10%, star indicates significance  at 5%.Table 8. ETA Results:  Robustness  of Competition  and Other Variables
Ml  M2  M3  M5  M6  M7
signifh-  signifi.  signifi-  signifi-  signifi-  signifi-
coef.  cance  coef.  cance  coef.  cance  coef.  cance  coef.  canoe  coef.  cance
XNTfMUSD  I  min  0o,  8%  0.005  23%  0.007  '  0.0  '3%  0.010  2%  0.005  9%
max  0.0t0  M%  0.009  5%  0.010  2%  0.d14  0%  0.014.  0%  0.009  2%
n  BUSFREEI  min  0.000  80%  -0.001  64%  0.000  84%  0.001  43%  0.001  45%  0.000  90%
max  0.003  7%  0.002  19%  0.003  9%  0.003  4%  0.004  2%  0.003  5%
t  BUSFREE2  min  0.000  80%  -0.001  64%  0.000  .34%  0.001  43%  0.001  45%  0.000  90%
mrnax  0.003  7%  0.002  19%  0.003  9%  0.003  4%  0.004  2%  0.003  5%
o  DISTRIBUTION_W13  min  -0.010  14%  -0.010  17%  -0.010  t8%  -0.006  41%  -0.006  44%  -0.010  18%
max  0.001  84%  0.000  95%  0.003  367%  0.005  50%  0.008  32%  0.005  50%
PCONTROL  min  0.000  74%  -0.001  54%  0.000  30%  0.000  89%  0.000  85%  -0.001  80%
*.  max  0.002  11%  0.002  13%  0.002  6%  0.002  8%  0.003  3%  0.002  10%
0  min  0.004  55%  0.005  53%  0.007  30%  0.004  59%  0.008  33%  0.006  41% O  PRODUCTMIRKT_WBI
max  0.014  2%  0.014  3%  0.019  V.  0.013  6%  0.019  1%  0.018  1%
UNFAIR,-  min  0.07  8%  0.004  36%  .0108  3%  0.003  46%  0.005  24%  0.007  5%
max  010  .)0%  0.009  4%  0.013  0%  0.009  3%  0.011  1%  0.013  0%
MRKTDOM  min  0.003  40%  0.005  33%  0.001  75%  0.006  16%  0.003  44%  0.001  84%
max  0.009  2%  0.011  2%  0.009  3%  0.014  0%  0.014  0%  0.007  8%
x  S30min  -0.004  78Y  -0.018  18%  -0.008  55%  0.001  97%  -0.002  90%  0.000  97%
0  max  0.009  40%  0.003  85%  0.009  44%  0.010  38%  0.009  43%  0.013  25%A
t  HERE30  min  0.000  40%  0.000  76%  0.000  73%  0.000  33%  0.000  60%  0.000  42%
max  0.000  19%  0.000  67%  0.000  33%  0.000  15%  0.000  31%  0.000  14%
min  -0.065  10%  -0.054  11%  -0.088  13%  -0.070  10%  -0.079  11%  -0.073  12% SOEI
(I)  max  0.058  26%  0.055  23%  0.033  54%  0.053  35%  0.023  71%  0.042  36%
SOE2  min  0.001  62%  0.001  46%  0.000  85%  0.000  98%  0.000  73%  0.000  72%
max  0.003  2%  0.003  1%  0.003  1%  0.002  15%  0.002  15%  0.003  1%
min  -0.001  2%  -0.001  2%  -0.001  4%  0.000  15%  0.000  24%  -0.001  4%
E0 nmax  0.000  16%  0,000  8%  0.000  42%  0.000  37%  0.000  72%  0.000  28%
ENTREPRENEUR  min  -0.011  62%  -0.014  58%  -0.007  78%  -0.020  35%  -0.022  35%  -0.007  77%
max  0.018  45%  0.017  44%  0.026  26%  0.004  84%  0.008  72%  0.022  35%
ASSAS  min  -0.004  29%  -0.005  23%  -0.004  37%  -0.003  40%  -0.004  43%  -0.005  29%
max  0.001  85%  -0.001  83%  0.002  60%1.  0.000  94%  0.002  66%  0.001  71%
2n  CrvlLB  min  -0.004  8%  -0.003  33%  -0.005  9%  -0.004  16%  -0.004  17/o  -0.005  10% am  CIVILUB
0  max  0.000  93%  0.002  44%  0.000  99%  0.000  96%  0.001  84%  0.000  95%
min  -0.003  10%  -0.002  41%  -0.004  7%6  -0.002  33%  -0.003  24%  -0.005  4%
0  CORRUPT
max  0.002  31%  0.002  33%  0.002  18%  0.002  22%  0.003  14%  0.002  29%
m  ENVRNMNT_WB  min  0.003  53%  0.004  37%  0.005  24%  0.004  49%  0.006  29%  0.002  59%
0  max  0.010  5%  0.011  5%  0.014  1%  0.011  5%  0.016  1%  0.013  2%
50  ETHINFRCT  min  0.000  7%  0.000  12%  0.000  10%  0.000  11%  0.000  17%  0.000  10%
E  Tmax  0.000  82%  0.000  44%  0.000  52%  0.000  44%  0.000  32%  0.000  59%
;  INSTITQUALITY  min  -0.002  42%  0.000  85%  -0.003  12%  -0.001  70%  -0.003  23%  -0.003  12%
,,,  max  0.005  10%  0.006  9%  0.005  16%  0.005  9%  0.005  16%  0.005  13%
PATENTS  mmin  0.000  4%  0.000  12%  0.000  8%  0.000  11%  0.000  16%  0.000  10%
max  0.000  92%  0.000  90%6  0.000  50%  0.000  99%  0.000  24%  0.000  53%
min  0.001  43%  0.002  18%  0.001  45%  0.001  64%  0.001  77%  0.001  54% POLICY
E  max  0.007  0%  0.007  0%  0.008  0%  0.006  0%  0.008  0%  0.008  0%
a
a  RULE_WB  min  -0.004  47%  40.005  37%  -0.001  81%  -0.003  60%  -0.001  90%  -0.001  80%/0
max  0.008  14%  0.006  29%  0.011  5%  0.010  8%  0.014  2%  0.011  4%
Note: Table reports the maxinum and minimum coefficient estmates from EBA analysis and theirsignrficance levels for each model.Table 9. Anti-Trust and Residual Growth Rates
A.  LATIN  AMERICAN SOUTHERN  CONE COUNTRIES
AGE25  ANTITRUST  RESIDUAL GROWTH
Chile  10.52  4.71  3.25%
Brazil  50.16  3.91  0.03%
Argentina  20.96  3.06  -0.08%
3.89  1.07%
B.  EMERGING  EU COUNTRIES
AGE25  ANTITRUST  RESIDUAL GROWTH
Ireland  29.32  4.87  2.91%
Portugal  27.8  4.45  0.77%
Spain  50.6  4.08  0.03%
Greece  3.92  -1.53%
4.33  0.01
C.  SMALL EUROPEAN  ECONOMIES
AGE25  ANTITRUST  RESIDUAL GROWTH
Norway  5.27  1.26%
Denmark  48.04  4.88  0.66%
Austria  33.64  4.76  0.39%
Belgium  48.72  4.59  0.45%
Iceland  3.67  0.37%
Netherlands  37.72  5.42  0.33%
Finland  4.23  -0.05%
Sweden  29.32  4.71  -0.43%
Luxembourg  4  -0.46%
4.53  0.00
D. ASIAN TIGERS
AGE25  ANTITRUST  RESIDUAL GROWTH
Korea, Rep.  23.52  3.79  1.84%
China  24.12  4.73  0.95%
Thailand  22.32  3.06  0.60%
Indonesia  21  3.25  0.17%
Malaysia  10.92  3.38  -0.14%
Hong Kong, China  10.52  3.5  0.04%
Singapore  14  4.48  -0.19%
Philippines  31.48  4  -1.36%
3.77  0.00
TRANSITION ECONOMIES(1)
AGE25  ANTITRUST  RESIDUAL  GROWTH
Poland  3.42  -1.37%
Hungary  4.01  -2.62%
Slovak Republic  40.64  3.55  -3.08%
Czech Republic  59.72  4.01  -3.35%
Russian Federation  2.78  -6.56%
3.55  -0.03Table 9. Anti-Trust  and Residual  (Growth  Rates
ANGLO-AMERICAN  ECONOMIES
AGE25  ANTITRU';T  RESIDUAL GROWTH
United States  5.09  0.78%
United Kingdom  44.52  5.39  0.47%
Australia  25.4  4.58  0.23%
Canada  41.28  5.03  -0.43%
New Zealand  33.2  5.11  -0.63%
5.04  0.00
LEFTOVERS
Israel  18.96  4.83  1.77%
India  28.92  3.82  1.68%
Turkey  3.3  1.42%
France  32.96  4.25  0.59%
Egypt,  Arab Rep.  3.43  0.55%
Italy  32.64  3.86  0.22%
Colombia  2.33  -0.23%
Switzerland  4.29  -0.41%
Zimbabwe  33.84  2.59  -0.48%
Venezuela  3.66  -0.53%
South Africa  39.84  3.26  -0.59%
Japan  39.56  4.52  -1.66%
Peru  29.6  3.95  -1.94%
Mexico  20.6  4.15  -2.29%
Jordan  2.13  -3.44%
Notes:
(1)  For  transition  econornies,  the  EBRD  publishes  annually  a 'transition  indicator'  for competition  policy  (ANTITRUST).
For  the  years  1995  and 1996,  Poland,  Hungary,  Slovak  Republic  and  Czech  Republic  were  each  assessed  3
and  Russia  2, on  a scale  from  1 tc 4+. See  Transition  Report  for 1995  and 1996.Policy  Research WDrking Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2302  Why  Liberalization  Alone  Has Not  Klaus  Deininger  March  2000  M. Fernandez
improved  Agricultural  Productivity  Pedro  Olinto  33766
in Zambia:  The  Role  of Asset
Ownership  arndc  Working  Capital
Constrainls
WPS2303 Malaria  and  Growth  F. Desmond  McCarthy  March  2000  H. Sladovich
Holger  Wolf  37698
Yi Wu
WPS2304  Disinflation  and  the Supply  Side  Pierre-Richard  Agenor  March  2000  T. Loftus
Lodovico  Pizzati  36317
WPS2305  Tne Impact  cf Banking  Crises  on  Maria  Soledad  Martinez  March  2000  A. Yaptemco
Money  Demand  and Price  Stability  Peria  31823
WPS2306 Intemational  Contagion:  Implications Roberto  Charg  March  2000  E. Mekhova
for Policy  Giovanni  Majnoni  85984
WPS2307 Surveying  Surveys  and Questioning  Francesca  Racanatini  March  2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Questions:  Learning  from  World Bank Scott J. Wallsten  37644
Experience  Lixin  Colin  Xu
WPS2308  How  Small  Should  an Economy's  Paul Beckerman  March  2000  H. Vargas
Fiscal  Deficit  Be?  A Monetary  38546
Programmring  Approach
WPS2309  What  Drives  Private  Saving  around  Norman  Loay2:a  March  2000  E. Khine
the World?  Klaus  Schmidl-Hebbel  37471
Luis Serven
WPS2310  How Politics  and Institu,ions  Affect  Mitchell  A. Orenstein  March  2000  M. Leenaerts
Pension  Reform  in Three  84264
Postcommunist  Countries
WPS231  1  The  Buenos  Aires  Water  Concession Lorena  Alcazar  April  2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Manuel  A.  Abdala  38526
Mary  M. Shirley
WPS2312  Measuring  Governance.  Corruption,  Joel  S. Hellman  April  2000  D. Bouvet
and  State  Cap-ure:  How  Firms  and  Geraint  Jones  35818
Bureaucrats  Shape  the Business  Daniel  Kaufmann
Environment  in Transition  Economies Mark  Schankerman
WPS2313 How  Interest  Rates  Changed  under  Patrick  Honohan  April  2000  A. Yaptenco
Financial  Liberalization:  A Cross-  31823
Counlry  ReviewPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2314  Technological  Leadership  and  Beata  K. Smarzynska  April 2000  L.  Tabada
Foreign  Investors'  Choice  of  36896
Entry  Mode
WPS2315 Investment  in Natural  Gas Pipelines  Alejandro  jadresic  April 2000  M. Salehi
in the Southern  Cone  of Latin  America  37157
WPS2316 Distrubutional  Outcomes  of a  Emanuela  Galasso  April  2000  P. Sader
Decentralized  Welfare  Program  Martin  Ravallion  33902
WPS2317 Trade  Negotiations  in the Presence  of  Keiko  Kubota  April  2000  L.  Tabada
Network  Externalities  36896
WPS2318  Regulatory  Reform,  Competition,  Mark  A. Dutz  April 2000  H. Sladovich
and Innovation:  A Case  Study  of the  Aydin Hayri  37698
Mexican  Road Freign  Industry  Pablo  Ibarra
WPS2319 Externalities  and Production  Gunnar  S. Eskeland  April  2000  H. Sladovich
Efficiency  37698